

# Bayesian Reasoning

## Chapter 13

1

## Today's class

- Probability theory
- Bayesian inference
  - From the joint distribution
  - Using independence/factoring
  - From sources of evidence

2

## Sources of uncertainty

- Uncertain **inputs**
  - Missing data
  - Noisy data
- Uncertain **knowledge**
  - Multiple causes lead to multiple effects
  - Incomplete enumeration of conditions or effects
  - Incomplete knowledge of causality in the domain
  - Probabilistic/stochastic effects
- Uncertain **outputs**
  - Abduction and induction are inherently uncertain
  - Default reasoning, even in deductive fashion, is uncertain
  - Incomplete deductive inference may be uncertain
- ▶ Probabilistic reasoning only gives probabilistic results (summarizes uncertainty from various sources)

3

## Decision making with uncertainty


### Rational behavior:

- For each possible action, identify the possible outcomes
- Compute the **probability** of each outcome
- Compute the **utility** of each outcome
- Compute the probability-weighted (**expected**) **utility** over possible outcomes for each action
- Select the action with the highest expected utility (principle of **Maximum Expected Utility**)

4

## Why probabilities anyway?

- Kolmogorov showed that three simple axioms lead to the rules of probability theory
  - De Finetti, Cox, and Carnap have also provided compelling arguments for these axioms
- 1. All probabilities are between 0 and 1:
  - $0 \leq P(a) \leq 1$
- 2. Valid propositions (tautologies) have probability 1, and unsatisfiable propositions have probability 0:
  - $P(\text{true}) = 1$ ;  $P(\text{false}) = 0$
- 3. The probability of a disjunction is given by:
  - $P(a \vee b) = P(a) + P(b) - P(a \wedge b)$



5

## Probability theory

- **Random variables**
  - Domain
- **Atomic event**: complete specification of state
- **Prior probability**: degree of belief without any other evidence
- **Joint probability**: matrix of combined probabilities of a set of variables
- Alarm, Burglary, Earthquake
  - Boolean (like these), discrete, continuous
- $\text{Alarm}=\text{True} \wedge \text{Burglary}=\text{True} \wedge \text{Earthquake}=\text{False}$   
 $\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary} \wedge \neg \text{earthquake}$
- $P(\text{Burglary}) = .1$
- $P(\text{Alarm, Burglary}) =$

	alarm	¬alarm
burglary	.09	.01
¬burglary	.1	.8

6

## Probability theory (cont.)

- **Conditional probability**: probability of effect given causes
- **Computing conditional probs**:
  - $P(a | b) = P(a \wedge b) / P(b)$
  - $P(b)$ : **normalizing** constant
- **Product rule**:
  - $P(a \wedge b) = P(a | b) P(b)$
- **Marginalizing**:
  - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B, a)$
  - $P(B) = \sum_a P(B | a) P(a)$  (**conditioning**)
- $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .47$   
 $P(\text{alarm} | \text{burglary}) = .9$
- $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) / P(\text{alarm}) = .09 / .19 = .47$
- $P(\text{burglary} \wedge \text{alarm}) = P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) P(\text{alarm}) = .47 * .19 = .09$
- $P(\text{alarm}) = P(\text{alarm} \wedge \text{burglary}) + P(\text{alarm} \wedge \neg \text{burglary}) = .09 + .1 = .19$

7

## Example: Inference from the joint

	alarm		¬alarm	
	earthquake	¬earthquake	earthquake	¬earthquake
burglary	.01	.08	.001	.009
¬burglary	.01	.09	.01	.79

$$P(\text{Burglary} | \text{alarm}) = \alpha P(\text{Burglary, alarm})$$

$$= \alpha [P(\text{Burglary, alarm, earthquake}) + P(\text{Burglary, alarm, ¬earthquake})]$$

$$= \alpha [ (.01, .01) + (.08, .09) ]$$

$$= \alpha [ (.09, .1) ]$$

Since  $P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) + P(\neg \text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = 1$ ,  $\alpha = 1 / (.09 + .1) = 5.26$  (i.e.,  $P(\text{alarm}) = 1/\alpha = .19$  – **quizlet**: how can you verify this?)

$$P(\text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .09 * 5.26 = .474$$

$$P(\neg \text{burglary} | \text{alarm}) = .1 * 5.26 = .526$$

8

## Exercise: Inference from the joint

p( $\text{smart} \wedge$ $\text{study} \wedge \text{prep}$ )	smart		$\neg$ smart	
	study	$\neg$ study	study	$\neg$ study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
$\neg$ prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

- **Queries:**
  - What is the prior probability of *smart*?
  - What is the prior probability of *study*?
  - What is the conditional probability of *prepared*, given *study* and *smart*?
- Save these answers for next time! 😊

9

## Independence

- When two sets of propositions do not affect each others' probabilities, we call them **independent**, and can easily compute their joint and conditional probability:
  - Independent (A, B)  $\rightarrow P(A \wedge B) = P(A) P(B)$ ,  $P(A | B) = P(A)$
- For example, {moon-phase, light-level} might be independent of {burglary, alarm, earthquake}
  - Then again, it might not: Burglars might be more likely to burglarize houses when there's a new moon (and hence little light)
  - But if we know the light level, the moon phase doesn't affect whether we are burglarized
  - Once we're burglarized, light level doesn't affect whether the alarm goes off
- We need a more complex notion of independence, and methods for reasoning about these kinds of relationships

10

## Exercise: Independence

p( $\text{smart} \wedge$ $\text{study} \wedge \text{prep}$ )	smart		$\neg$ smart	
	study	$\neg$ study	study	$\neg$ study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
$\neg$ prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

- **Queries:**
  - Is *smart* independent of *study*?
  - Is *prepared* independent of *study*?

11

## Conditional independence

- Absolute independence:
  - A and B are **independent** if  $P(A \wedge B) = P(A) P(B)$ ; equivalently,  $P(A) = P(A | B)$  and  $P(B) = P(B | A)$
- A and B are **conditionally independent** given C if
  - $P(A \wedge B | C) = P(A | C) P(B | C)$
- This lets us decompose the joint distribution:
  - $P(A \wedge B \wedge C) = P(A | C) P(B | C) P(C)$
- Moon-Phase and Burglary are **conditionally independent given** Light-Level
- Conditional independence is weaker than absolute independence, but still useful in decomposing the full joint probability distribution

12

## Exercise: Conditional independence

p(smart ∧ study ∧ prep)	smart		¬smart	
	study	¬study	study	¬study
prepared	.432	.16	.084	.008
¬prepared	.048	.16	.036	.072

- **Queries:**
  - Is *smart* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *study*?
  - Is *study* conditionally independent of *prepared*, given *smart*?

13


## Bayes's rule

- Bayes's rule is derived from the product rule:
  - $P(Y | X) = P(X | Y) P(Y) / P(X)$
- Often useful for diagnosis:
  - If X are (observed) effects and Y are (hidden) causes,
  - We may have a model for how causes lead to effects ( $P(X | Y)$ )
  - We may also have prior beliefs (based on experience) about the frequency of occurrence of effects ( $P(Y)$ )
  - Which allows us to reason abductively from effects to causes ( $P(Y | X)$ ).

14

## Bayesian inference

- In the setting of diagnostic/evidential reasoning



- Know prior probability of hypothesis  $P(H_i)$
- Know conditional probability  $P(E_j | H_i)$
- Want to compute the *posterior probability*  $P(H_i | E_j)$
- Bayes's theorem (formula 1):

$$P(H_i | E_j) = P(H_i)P(E_j | H_i) / P(E_j)$$

15

## Simple Bayesian diagnostic reasoning

- Knowledge base:
  - Evidence / manifestations:  $E_1, \dots, E_m$
  - Hypotheses / disorders:  $H_1, \dots, H_n$ 
    - $E_j$  and  $H_i$  are **binary**; hypotheses are **mutually exclusive** (non-overlapping) and **exhaustive** (cover all possible cases)
  - Conditional probabilities:  $P(E_j | H_i), i = 1, \dots, n; j = 1, \dots, m$
- Cases (evidence for a particular instance):  $E_1, \dots, E_l$
- Goal: Find the hypothesis  $H_i$  with the highest posterior
  - $\text{Max}_i P(H_i | E_1, \dots, E_l)$

16

## Bayesian diagnostic reasoning II

- Bayes' rule says that
  - $P(H_i | E_1, \dots, E_n) = P(E_1, \dots, E_n | H_i) P(H_i) / P(E_1, \dots, E_n)$
- Assume each piece of evidence  $E_i$  is conditionally independent of the others, *given* a hypothesis  $H_i$ , then:
  - $P(E_1, \dots, E_n | H_i) = \prod_{j=1}^n P(E_j | H_i)$
- If we only care about relative probabilities for the  $H_i$ , then we have:
  - $P(H_i | E_1, \dots, E_n) = \alpha P(H_i) \prod_{j=1}^n P(E_j | H_i)$

17

## Limitations of simple Bayesian inference

- Cannot easily handle multi-fault situations, nor cases where intermediate (hidden) causes exist:
  - Disease D causes syndrome S, which causes correlated manifestations  $M_1$  and  $M_2$
- Consider a composite hypothesis  $H_1 \wedge H_2$ , where  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are independent. What is the relative posterior?
  - $P(H_1 \wedge H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_n) = \alpha P(E_1, \dots, E_n | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1 \wedge H_2)$ 

$$= \alpha P(E_1, \dots, E_n | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1) P(H_2)$$

$$= \alpha \prod_{j=1}^n P(E_j | H_1 \wedge H_2) P(H_1) P(H_2)$$
- How do we compute  $P(E_j | H_1 \wedge H_2)$  ??

18

## Limitations of simple Bayesian inference II

- Assume  $H_1$  and  $H_2$  are independent, given  $E_1, \dots, E_n$ ?
  - $P(H_1 \wedge H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_n) = P(H_1 | E_1, \dots, E_n) P(H_2 | E_1, \dots, E_n)$
- This is a very unreasonable assumption
  - Earthquake and Burglar are independent, but *not* given Alarm:
    - $P(\text{burglar} | \text{alarm}, \text{earthquake}) \ll P(\text{burglar} | \text{alarm})$
- Another limitation is that simple application of Bayes's rule doesn't allow us to handle causal chaining:
  - A: this year's weather; B: cotton production; C: next year's cotton price
  - A influences C indirectly:  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$
  - $P(C | B, A) = P(C | B)$
- Need a richer representation to model interacting hypotheses, conditional independence, and causal chaining
- Next time: conditional independence and Bayesian networks!

19