

First-Order Logic: Review

First-order logic

- First-order logic (FOL) models the world in terms of
 - **Objects**, which are things with individual identities
 - **Properties** of objects that distinguish them from others
 - **Relations** that hold among sets of objects
 - **Functions**, which are a subset of relations where there is only one “value” for any given “input”
- Examples:
 - Objects: Students, lectures, companies, cars ...
 - Relations: Brother-of, bigger-than, outside, part-of, has-color, occurs-after, owns, visits, precedes, ...
 - Properties: blue, oval, even, large, ...
 - Functions: father-of, best-friend, second-half, more-than ...

User provides

- **Constant symbols** representing individuals in the world
 - Mary, 3, green
- **Function symbols**, map individuals to individuals
 - father_of(Mary) = John
 - color_of(Sky) = Blue
- **Predicate symbols**, map individuals to truth values
 - greater(5,3)
 - green(Grass)
 - color(Grass, Green)

FOL Provides

- **Variable symbols**
 - E.g., x, y, foo
- **Connectives**
 - Same as in propositional logic: not (\neg), and (\wedge), or (\vee), implies (\rightarrow), iff (\leftrightarrow)
- **Quantifiers**
 - Universal $\forall x$ or (**Ax**)
 - Existential $\exists x$ or (**Ex**)

Sentences: built from terms and atoms

- A **term** (denoting a real-world individual) is a constant symbol, variable symbol, or n-place function of n terms.
 - x and $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ are terms, where each x_i is a term
 - A term with no variables is a **ground term** (i.e., john, father_of(father_of(john)))
- An **atomic sentence** (which has value true or false) is an n-place predicate of n terms (e.g., green(Kermit))
- A **complex sentence** is formed from atomic sentences connected by the logical connectives:
 - $\neg P, P \vee Q, P \wedge Q, P \rightarrow Q, P \leftrightarrow Q$ where P and Q are sentences

Sentences: built from terms and atoms

- A **quantified sentence** adds quantifiers \forall and \exists
- A **well-formed formula (wff)** is a sentence containing no “free” variables. That is, all variables are “bound” by universal or existential quantifiers.
 - ($\forall x$)P(x,y) has x bound as a universally quantified variable, but y is free

A BNF for FOL

```
S := <Sentence> ;
<Sentence> := <AtomicSentence> |
  <Sentence> <Connective> <Sentence> |
  <Quantifier> <Variable>, ... <Sentence> |
  "NOT" <Sentence> |
  "(" <Sentence> ")";
<AtomicSentence> := <Predicate> "(" <Term>, ... ")" |
  <Term> "=" <Term>;
<Term> := <Function> "(" <Term>, ... ")" |
  <Constant> |
  <Variable>;
<Connective> := "AND" | "OR" | "IMPLIES" | "EQUIVALENT";
<Quantifier> := "EXISTS" | "FORALL";
<Constant> := "A" | "X1" | "John" | ... ;
<Variable> := "a" | "x" | "s" | ... ;
<Predicate> := "Before" | "HasColor" | "Raining" | ... ;
<Function> := "Mother" | "LeftLegOf" | ... ;
```

Quantifiers

- **Universal quantification**
 - ($\forall x$)P(x) means P holds for **all** values of x in domain associated with variable
 - E.g., ($\forall x$) dolphin(x) \rightarrow mammal(x)
- **Existential quantification**
 - ($\exists x$)P(x) means P holds for **some** value of x in domain associated with variable
 - E.g., ($\exists x$) mammal(x) \wedge lays_eggs(x)
 - Permits one to make a statement about some object without naming it

Quantifiers

- Universal quantifiers often used with *implies* to form *rules*:
 $(\forall x) \text{ student}(x) \rightarrow \text{smart}(x)$ means “All students are smart”
- Universal quantification is *rarely* used to make blanket statements about every individual in the world:
 $(\forall x) \text{ student}(x) \wedge \text{smart}(x)$ means “Everyone in the world is a student and is smart”
- Existential quantifiers are usually used with “and” to specify a list of properties about an individual:
 $(\exists x) \text{ student}(x) \wedge \text{smart}(x)$ means “There is a student who is smart”
- Common mistake: represent this EN sentence in FOL as:
 $(\exists x) \text{ student}(x) \rightarrow \text{smart}(x)$
 – What does this sentence mean?

Quantifier Scope

- FOL sentences have structure, like programs
- In particular, the variables in a sentence have a scope
- For example, suppose we want to say
 – “everyone who is alive loves someone”
 $\neg(\forall x) \text{ alive}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y) \text{ loves}(x,y)$
- Here’s how we scope the variables

$(\forall x) \text{ alive}(x) \rightarrow (\exists y) \text{ loves}(x,y)$

— Scope of x
 — Scope of y

Quantifier Scope

- **Switching order of universal quantifiers *does not* change the meaning**
 $\neg(\forall x)(\forall y)P(x,y) \leftrightarrow (\forall y)(\forall x) P(x,y)$
 – “Dogs hate cats”
- **You can switch order of existential quantifiers**
 $\neg(\exists x)(\exists y)P(x,y) \leftrightarrow (\exists y)(\exists x) P(x,y)$
 – “A cat killed a dog”
- **Switching order of universals and existentials *does* change meaning:**
 – Everyone likes someone: $(\forall x)(\exists y) \text{ likes}(x,y)$
 – Someone is liked by everyone: $(\exists y)(\forall x) \text{ likes}(x,y)$

Connections between All and Exists

- We can relate sentences involving \forall and \exists using **De Morgan’s laws**:
 1. $(\forall x) \neg P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\exists x) P(x)$
 2. $\neg(\forall x) P \leftrightarrow (\exists x) \neg P(x)$
 3. $(\forall x) P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\exists x) \neg P(x)$
 4. $(\exists x) P(x) \leftrightarrow \neg(\forall x) \neg P(x)$
- Examples
 1. All dogs don’t like cats \leftrightarrow No dogs like cats
 2. Not all dogs dance \leftrightarrow There is a dog that doesn’t dance
 3. All dogs sleep \leftrightarrow There is no dog that doesn’t sleep
 4. There is a dog that talks \leftrightarrow Not all dogs can’t talk

Quantified inference rules

- Universal instantiation
 - $\forall x P(x) \therefore P(A)$
- Universal generalization
 - $P(A) \wedge P(B) \dots \therefore \forall x P(x)$
- Existential instantiation
 - $\exists x P(x) \therefore P(F)$ ←skolem constant F
- Existential generalization
 - $P(A) \therefore \exists x P(x)$ *F must be a "new" constant not appearing in the KB*

Universal instantiation (a.k.a. universal elimination)

- If $(\forall x) P(x)$ is true, then $P(C)$ is true, where C is *any* constant in the domain of x , e.g.:
 - $(\forall x) \text{eats}(\text{John}, x) \Rightarrow$
 $\text{eats}(\text{John}, \text{Cheese18})$
- Note that function applied to ground terms is also a constant
 - $(\forall x) \text{eats}(\text{John}, x) \Rightarrow$
 $\text{eats}(\text{John}, \text{contents}(\text{Box42}))$

Existential instantiation (a.k.a. existential elimination)

- From $(\exists x) P(x)$ infer $P(c)$, e.g.:
 - $(\exists x) \text{eats}(\text{Mickey}, x) \rightarrow \text{eats}(\text{Mickey}, \text{Stuff345})$
- The variable is replaced by a **brand-new constant** not occurring in this or any sentence in the KB
- Also known as skolemization; constant is a **skolem constant**
- We don't want to accidentally draw other inferences about it by introducing the constant
- Can use this to reason about unknown objects, rather than constantly manipulating existential quantifiers

Existential generalization (a.k.a. existential introduction)

- If $P(c)$ is true, then $(\exists x) P(x)$ is inferred, e.g.:
 - $\text{Eats}(\text{Mickey}, \text{Cheese18}) \Rightarrow$
 $(\exists x) \text{eats}(\text{Mickey}, x)$
- All instances of the given constant symbol are replaced by the new variable symbol
- Note that the variable symbol cannot already exist anywhere in the expression

Translating English to FOL

Every gardener likes the sun

$\forall x \text{ gardener}(x) \rightarrow \text{likes}(x, \text{Sun})$

You can fool some of the people all of the time

$\exists x \forall t \text{ person}(x) \wedge \text{time}(t) \rightarrow \text{can-fool}(x, t)$

You can fool all of the people some of the time

$\forall x \exists t (\text{person}(x) \rightarrow \text{time}(t) \wedge \text{can-fool}(x, t))$ Note 2 possible readings of NL sentence

$\forall x (\text{person}(x) \rightarrow \exists t (\text{time}(t) \wedge \text{can-fool}(x, t)))$

All purple mushrooms are poisonous

$\forall x (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \rightarrow \text{poisonous}(x)$

Translating English to FOL

No purple mushroom is poisonous (two ways)

$\neg \exists x \text{ purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{poisonous}(x)$

$\forall x (\text{mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x)) \rightarrow \neg \text{poisonous}(x)$

There are exactly two purple mushrooms

$\exists x \exists y \text{ mushroom}(x) \wedge \text{purple}(x) \wedge \text{mushroom}(y) \wedge \text{purple}(y) \wedge \neg(x=y) \wedge \forall z (\text{mushroom}(z) \wedge \text{purple}(z)) \rightarrow ((x=z) \vee (y=z))$

Obama is not short

$\neg \text{short}(\text{Obama})$

Logic and People



"Logic—the last refuge of a scoundrel."

- People can easily be confused by logic
- And are often suspicious of it, or give it too much weight

19

Monty Python example (Russell & Norvig)



FIRST VILLAGER: We have found a witch. May we burn her?

ALL: A witch! Burn her!

BEDEVERE: Why do you think she is a witch?

SECOND VILLAGER: She turned *me* into a newt.

B: A newt?

V2 (after looking at himself for some time): I got better.

ALL: Burn her anyway.

B: Quiet! Quiet! There are ways of telling whether she is a witch.

20



B: Tell me... what do you do with witches?
ALL: Burn them!
B: And what do you burn, apart from witches?
V4: ...wood?
B: So **why do witches burn?**
V2 (pianissimo): **because they're made of wood?**
B: Good.
ALL: I see. Yes, of course.

21

B: So how can we tell if she is made of wood?

V1: Make a bridge out of her.

B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?

ALL: Yes, of course... um... er...

B: Does wood sink in water?

ALL: No, no, it floats. Throw her in the pond.

B: Wait. Wait... tell me, what also floats on water?

ALL: Bread? No, no no. Apples... gravy... very small rocks...

B: No, no, no,



22



KING ARTHUR: A duck!
(They all turn and look at Arthur. Bedevere looks up, very impressed.)
B: Exactly. So... logically...
V1 (beginning to pick up the thread): **If she... weighs the same as a duck... she's made of wood.**
B: And therefore?
ALL: **A witch!**

23

Fallacy: Affirming the conclusion

$\forall x \text{ witch}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$

$\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{burns}(x)$

 $\therefore \forall z \text{ witch}(z) \rightarrow \text{wood}(z)$

$p \rightarrow q$

$r \rightarrow q$

 $p \rightarrow r$



24

Monty Python Near-Fallacy #2

$\text{wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{can-build-bridge}(x)$

 $\therefore \text{can-build-bridge}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$

- B: Ah... but can you not also make bridges out of stone?

25

Monty Python Fallacy #3

$\forall x \text{ wood}(x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$

$\forall x \text{ duck-weight}(x) \rightarrow \text{floats}(x)$

 $\therefore \forall x \text{ duck-weight}(x) \rightarrow \text{wood}(x)$

$p \rightarrow q$

$r \rightarrow q$

 $\therefore r \rightarrow p$

26

Monty Python Fallacy #4

$\forall z \text{ light}(z) \rightarrow \text{wood}(z)$

$\text{light}(W)$

 $\therefore \text{wood}(W)$ % ok.....

$\text{witch}(W) \rightarrow \text{wood}(W)$ % applying universal instan.
% to fallacious conclusion #1

$\text{wood}(W)$

 $\therefore \text{witch}(z)$

27

Example: A simple genealogy KB by FOL

- **Build a small genealogy knowledge base using FOL that**
 - contains facts of immediate family relations (spouses, parents, etc.)
 - contains definitions of more complex relations (ancestors, relatives)
 - is able to answer queries about relationships between people
- **Predicates:**
 - $\text{parent}(x, y)$, $\text{child}(x, y)$, $\text{father}(x, y)$, $\text{daughter}(x, y)$, etc.
 - $\text{spouse}(x, y)$, $\text{husband}(x, y)$, $\text{wife}(x, y)$
 - $\text{ancestor}(x, y)$, $\text{descendant}(x, y)$
 - $\text{male}(x)$, $\text{female}(y)$
 - $\text{relative}(x, y)$
- **Facts:**
 - $\text{husband}(\text{Joe}, \text{Mary})$, $\text{son}(\text{Fred}, \text{Joe})$
 - $\text{spouse}(\text{John}, \text{Nancy})$, $\text{male}(\text{John})$, $\text{son}(\text{Mark}, \text{Nancy})$
 - $\text{father}(\text{Jack}, \text{Nancy})$, $\text{daughter}(\text{Linda}, \text{Jack})$
 - $\text{daughter}(\text{Liz}, \text{Linda})$
 - etc.

• **Rules for genealogical relations**

- $(\forall x,y) \text{parent}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{child}(y, x)$
- $(\forall x,y) \text{father}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x)$;similarly for mother(x, y)
- $(\forall x,y) \text{daughter}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{child}(x, y) \wedge \text{female}(x)$;similarly for son(x, y)
- $(\forall x,y) \text{husband}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{spouse}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x)$;similarly for wife(x, y)
- $(\forall x,y) \text{spouse}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{spouse}(y, x)$;**spouse relation is symmetric**
- $(\forall x,y) \text{parent}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{ancestor}(x, y)$
- $(\forall x,y)(\exists z) \text{parent}(x, z) \wedge \text{ancestor}(z, y) \rightarrow \text{ancestor}(x, y)$
- $(\forall x,y) \text{descendant}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{ancestor}(y, x)$
- $(\forall x,y)(\exists z) \text{ancestor}(z, x) \wedge \text{ancestor}(z, y) \rightarrow \text{relative}(x, y)$
;related by common ancestry
- $(\forall x,y) \text{spouse}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{relative}(x, y)$;related by marriage
- $(\forall x,y)(\exists z) \text{relative}(z, x) \wedge \text{relative}(z, y) \rightarrow \text{relative}(x, y)$;**transitive**
- $(\forall x,y) \text{relative}(x, y) \leftrightarrow \text{relative}(y, x)$;**symmetric**

• **Queries**

- $\text{ancestor}(\text{Jack}, \text{Fred})$; the answer is yes
- $\text{relative}(\text{Liz}, \text{Joe})$; the answer is yes
- $\text{relative}(\text{Nancy}, \text{Matthew})$
;no answer in general, no if under closed world assumption
- $(\exists z) \text{ancestor}(z, \text{Fred}) \wedge \text{ancestor}(z, \text{Liz})$

Axioms for Set Theory in FOL

1. The only sets are the empty set and those made by adjoining something to a set:
 $\forall s \text{set}(s) \iff (s = \text{EmptySet}) \vee (\exists x,r \text{Set}(r) \wedge s = \text{Adjoin}(s,r))$
2. The empty set has no elements adjoined to it:
 $\sim \exists x,s \text{Adjoin}(x,s) = \text{EmptySet}$
3. Adjoining an element already in the set has no effect:
 $\forall x,s \text{Member}(x,s) \iff s = \text{Adjoin}(x,s)$
4. The only members of a set are the elements that were adjoined into it:
 $\forall x,s \text{Member}(x,s) \iff \exists y,r (s = \text{Adjoin}(y,r) \wedge (x=y \vee \text{Member}(x,r)))$
5. A set is a subset of another iff all of the 1st set's members are members of the 2nd:
 $\forall s,r \text{Subset}(s,r) \iff (\forall x \text{Member}(x,s) \Rightarrow \text{Member}(x,r))$
6. Two sets are equal iff each is a subset of the other:
 $\forall s,r (s=r) \iff (\text{subset}(s,r) \wedge \text{subset}(r,s))$
7. Intersection
 $\forall x,s1,s2 \text{member}(X, \text{intersection}(S1,S2)) \iff \text{member}(X,s1) \wedge \text{member}(X,s2)$
8. Union
 $\exists x,s1,s2 \text{member}(X, \text{union}(s1,s2)) \iff \text{member}(X,s1) \vee \text{member}(X,s2)$

Semantics of FOL

- **Domain M:** the set of all objects in the world (of interest)
- **Interpretation I:** includes
 - Assign each constant to an object in M
 - Define each function of n arguments as a mapping $M^n \Rightarrow M$
 - Define each predicate of n arguments as a mapping $M^n \Rightarrow \{T, F\}$
 - Therefore, every ground predicate with any instantiation will have a truth value
 - In general there is an infinite number of interpretations because |M| is infinite
- **Define logical connectives:** $\sim, \wedge, \vee, \Rightarrow, \iff$ as in PL
- **Define semantics of $(\forall x)$ and $(\exists x)$**
 - $(\forall x) P(x)$ is true iff P(x) is true under all interpretations
 - $(\exists x) P(x)$ is true iff P(x) is true under some interpretation

- **Model:** an interpretation of a set of sentences such that every sentence is *True*
- **A sentence is**
 - **satisfiable** if it is true under some interpretation
 - **valid** if it is true under all possible interpretations
 - **inconsistent** if there does not exist any interpretation under which the sentence is true
- **Logical consequence:** $S \models X$ if all models of S are also models of X

Axioms, definitions and theorems

- **Axioms** are facts and rules that attempt to capture all of the (important) facts and concepts about a domain; axioms can be used to prove **theorems**
 - Mathematicians don't want any unnecessary (dependent) axioms, i.e. ones that can be derived from other axioms
 - Dependent axioms can make reasoning faster, however
 - Choosing a good set of axioms for a domain is a design problem
- A **definition** of a predicate is of the form " $p(X) \leftrightarrow \dots$ " and can be decomposed into two parts
 - **Necessary** description: " $p(x) \rightarrow \dots$ "
 - **Sufficient** description " $p(x) \leftarrow \dots$ "
 - Some concepts don't have complete definitions (e.g., person(x))

More on definitions


- Example: define father(x, y) by parent(x, y) and male(x)
- **parent(x, y)** is a necessary (but not sufficient) description of father(x, y)

$$\text{father}(x, y) \rightarrow \text{parent}(x, y)$$
 - **parent(x, y) ^ male(x) ^ age(x, 35)** is a sufficient (but not necessary) description of father(x, y):

$$\text{father}(x, y) \leftarrow \text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x) \wedge \text{age}(x, 35)$$
 - **parent(x, y) ^ male(x)** is a necessary and sufficient description of father(x, y)

$$\text{parent}(x, y) \wedge \text{male}(x) \leftrightarrow \text{father}(x, y)$$

More on definitions



Higher-order logic

- FOL only allows to quantify over variables, and variables can only range over objects.
- HOL allows us to quantify over relations
- Example: (quantify over functions)

“two functions are equal iff they produce the same value for all arguments”

$$\forall f \forall g (f = g) \Leftrightarrow (\forall x f(x) = g(x))$$
- Example: (quantify over predicates)

$$\forall r \text{transitive}(r) \rightarrow (\forall xyz) r(x,y) \wedge r(y,z) \rightarrow r(x,z)$$
- More expressive, but undecidable, in general

Expressing uniqueness

- Sometimes we want to say that there is a single, unique object that satisfies a certain condition
- “There exists a unique x such that $\text{king}(x)$ is true”
 - $\exists x \text{ king}(x) \wedge \forall y (\text{king}(y) \rightarrow x=y)$
 - $\exists x \text{ king}(x) \wedge \neg \exists y (\text{king}(y) \wedge x \neq y)$
 - $\exists! x \text{ king}(x)$
- “Every country has exactly one ruler”
 - $\forall c \text{ country}(c) \rightarrow \exists! r \text{ ruler}(c,r)$
- Iota operator: “ $\iota x P(x)$ ” means “the unique x such that $p(x)$ is true”
 - “The unique ruler of Freedonia is dead”
 - $\text{dead}(\iota x \text{ ruler}(\text{freedonia},x))$

37

Notational differences

- **Different symbols** for *and*, *or*, *not*, *implies*, ...
 - $\forall \exists \Rightarrow \Leftrightarrow \wedge \vee \neg \bullet \supset$
 - $p \vee (q \wedge r)$
 - $p + (q * r)$
 - etc
- **Prolog**
 - $\text{cat}(X) :- \text{furry}(X), \text{meows}(X), \text{has}(X, \text{claws})$
- **Lispy notations**
 - (forall ?x (implies (and (furry ?x)
 - (meows ?x)
 - (has ?x claws))
 - (cat ?x)))

38

Summary

- First order logic (FOL) introduces predicates, functions and quantifiers
- Much more expressive, but reasoning is more complex
 - Reasoning is semi-decidable
- FOL is a common AI knowledge representation language
- Other KR languages (e.g., OWL) are often defined by mapping them to FOL
- FOL variables range over objects
- HOL variables can range over functions, predicates or sentences